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NETWORK STORIES
JULIE E. COHEN*
In 1962, Rachel Carson named the natural environment.1 Scientists were
beginning to understand the complex web of ecological cause and effect;
naming that web gave it independent existence and invested that existence with
political meaning. In 1996, James Boyle named the cultural environment.
Boyle’s act of naming was intended to jumpstart a political movement by
appropriating the complex web of political meaning centered on the
interdependency of environmental resources.2
But naming, although important, is only a beginning. The example of the
natural environment shows us that to build from a name to a movement
requires two things. First, you have to do the science, which means generating
detailed descriptions of how this environment works and what harms it. Second,
you have to generate a normative theory powerful enough to overcome all
competing narratives: a story about what makes this environment good. In the
context of culture, however, there is an important difference: Cultural harm is
less amenable to scientific proof. Cultural change may be empirically and
anecdotally demonstrated, but cultural harm is in the eye of the beholder. This
means that the normative theory needs to do heavier lifting.
Proponents of cultural environmentalism, then, need to tackle the
normative theory: to formulate a theory of “the network” as a whole that
explains what makes it good. This is part of the point of Boyle’s original
argument, and also the point of Susan Crawford’s excellent paper.3 Although
carving out open enclaves is important, in the final analysis the cultural
environment won’t be saved a piece at a time. It will be saved only when we
recognize it as an entity that is more than just the sum of its parts.
So what makes “the network” good? Scholarly and popular discussion by
and among open-network advocates suggests two answers: The network is us,
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and the network that is us is a separate entity with a life and a liberty of its own.
These answers seem to me to be inconsistent, and the second one strikes me as
unsupportable in light of the first. If the network is us, then it isn’t a separate
entity. It isn’t an ocean or any other natural ecology; it isn’t a separate, reified
“space”; it isn’t a natural, preexisting entity at all, but a social one. To say that
the network has a life of its own is to assert that there is a natural form of social
ordering that the open Internet enables us to achieve. Both social theory and
the new science of networks tell us that that is nonsense. The social formations
that make up the network exhibit patterns and create path-dependencies. The
network that Boyle and Crawford want to preserve is the social one that
emerges when the new patterns of information flow enabled by the open
Internet are layered over the patterns of flow that preceded it. The battle that is
being fought in Washington is being fought because some powerful interests
want to reconfigure the Internet to reinforce old patterns and pathdependencies. Boyle and Crawford want to preserve its ability to enable new
ones, and that is a goal I wholeheartedly support.
Simply to say that the network is us, though, doesn’t tell us anything terribly
specific about what makes it good. After all, a network of private internets
would still be us. Here we need to come back to the first inquiry that naming
the cultural environment requires, which I characterized earlier as “doing the
science” necessary to understand how the cultural environment works, and
what harms it. This is, paradoxically, where the power of the environmental
analogy ends; arguments from biodiversity and evolutionary theory will not do.
What makes the network good can only be defined by generating richly detailed
ethnographies of the experiences the network enables and the activities it
supports, and articulating a normative theory to explain what is good, and
worth preserving, about those experiences and activities. To say that the
network is us is to say that the network is the sum of the experiences and
actions of its individual, situated users, and of the patterns and flows that their
interactions create.
Here there is a further difficulty: How does one articulate a normative
theory that preserves the link to experience, but at the same time convinces
individuals to look beyond their own experiences? For users of the new private
internets, what exactly will the shift to a private internet change (or threaten)?
This question cannot be answered with rote invocation of the abstract concepts
of “innovation” or “democracy.” If we are to take seriously the statement that
the Internet is us, the answers we provide must remain systematically linked to
the concrete realities of everyday experience. We must find a way to describe
what an open network will allow users to encounter, and what it will enable
them to create, that enables users to see beyond those immediacies to the larger
patterns.
The beginnings of one such description can be glimpsed around the edges of
the more exceptionalist arguments offered by many open-network advocates, in
the examples of dialogue, group formation, and group-based creativity that they
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provide. The organizing principle underlying these examples is the emergence
of groups and collectivities. But I want to suggest two more general and, I think,
more apposite organizing principles: First, the network enables the creation of
meaning, for both individuals and groups. What we need now is to dispense
with the equally abstract romanticism of cyberspace exceptionalism and
emphasize all of the concrete, everyday ways in which the open Internet enables
the creation of meaning by and for real people in real spaces. Not bits, not
abstract, disembodied information that has independent properties of flow, but
meaning. Second, meaning emerges through and because of the opportunities
for play that the network affords. Meaning emerges from the sorts of expression
conventionally understood as expression—from the generation of dialogue on
blogs, the formation of affinity groups, and the construction of authoritative
texts on wikis. Private internets may enable the first activity, but will they also
enable the latter two to the same extent? Meaning emerges also from
expression not conventionally understood as such—from what Edward Felten
has called freedom to tinker4—and from fortuitous encounters within the
network. Will private internets enable these activities?
Here we come to the crux of the matter: The telecommunication companies
and cable companies aren’t stupid. They likely will enable all of these
activities—at least at first, at least to a degree. How much enablement is
required? All protocols constrain. What quantum of constriction equals a
threat? From the perspective of the individual, situated user, how would we
know? And why should we care? How can we assess the options that we aren’t
given?
This is where we need stories—histories, romances, and myths—that remind
people how meaning emerges from the uncontrolled and unexpected. We need
stories that emphasize the meaning of being allowed to decide for ourselves
what meaning to create, and how. We need stories that highlight the importance
of cultural play, and of the spaces and contexts within which play occurs. Smart
providers of private internet service know this too, and so the emergence of the
rhetoric of play has led content providers and Internet access providers here
and there to talk about constructing playgrounds.5 But playgrounds are for
children. There is a middle space between the controlled disorder of the
playground and outright chaos, where adults get to choose what they will hold
meaningful, with whom they will associate, what they will build. That is the
space of the open network, and that is the good we need to be discussing.
Susan Crawford says that we all need to become telecommunications
scholars, and maybe we do, but there are other resources that seem even more
germane to the task of narrative-building that she envisions. Social and cultural
theorists have long studied the interlocking systems of culture, and have
4. See generally Edward Felten, Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2006).
5. See, e.g., Packard Bell Playground, http://www.packardbell.co.uk/products/playground/ (last
visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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developed a keen appreciation of their interdependencies. We in the legal
academy, with our commitments to abstract economic analysis or to equally
abstract and decontextualized theories of rights and democratic discourse, have
not looked closely enough at these resources.6 And perhaps the political
movements to which we should be looking for inspiration include not only the
environmental movement, but also social movements concerned more directly
with relations of culture, identity, and equality.7 Perhaps, for example, we might
build from the feminist rallying cry, “Get your laws off my body,” to our own:
“Get your rules off my mind.”
Finally, it is important to remember that the network is only as open as its
endpoints will allow. A network neutrality mandate would not address another
threat to openness within the cultural environment, one that in the end may be
more serious. That is the threat of the trusted system—what I have called
pervasively distributed copyright enforcement and what Jonathan Zittrain has
called the advent of the information appliance.8 We know how to worry about
monopolists we can see. We do not yet know how to worry about authorization
and constraint embedded in the consumer technologies that operate at the
endpoints of the network, and if those forces are deployed through ostensibly
collaborative market processes there may be no visible entity or oligopoly at
which to point.
Telecommunications law has little to say about the sort of control that
trusted systems enable. Addressing this threat to the cultural environment also
requires more than a theory founded on the four regulatory modalities that
Larry Lessig so perceptively identified for us, and that are of most direct and
instrumental interest to policymakers.9 Here again, to understand how control
at the ends structures the experience of the network, we need a social theory:
one that situates regulation by protocol within the context of social and cultural
ordering more generally. And here again, the theory needs to be firmly
grounded in the everyday experience of network users, and in the patterns of
interaction that the network enables or forbids.10
In sum, generating a normative theory of the open network requires more
than a theory of intellectual property or telecommunications, and “doing the
science” of cultural environmentalism requires more than appropriation of the
environmental metaphor. Cultural environmentalism is like environmentalism,
6. I consider what copyright scholarship can learn from social and cultural theory in Julie E.
Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007).
7. Important recent work explicitly linking intellectual property policy with social justice includes
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public
Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development
3
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 6 (2006); and Madhavi Sunder, IP , 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006).
8. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1
(2006); Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006).
9. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
10. For preliminary steps in that direction, see generally Cohen, supra note 8, and Julie E. Cohen,
Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007).
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but it is also different. If it is to succeed, cultural environmentalism must
grapple directly with culture. In cultural environmentalism’s next decade, I very
much hope that we will make that our shared project.

